Today, the Iraqi Parliament postponed a scheduled vote on the U.S.-Iraq Security agreement.  In order to get broad support in Parliament for the security agreement, Maliki and his allies appear to have given into a Sunni demand to hold a national referendum on the agreement in 2009.  The referendum would create a potentially dangerous political wild card, especially since it would occur around the time of next year's national elections.  The possible consequences of such a referendum are unclear but may well complicate the prospects for a smooth withdrawal.  Maliki and his allies also made a number of other political concessions to the Sunnis that are precisely the type of positive steps needed for political reconciliation.  These initiatives would not have passed without the Sunni leverage over the withdrawal agreement. 

Overall, this newest curveball demonstrates a number of key points.  First, the U.S. presence in Iraq is unpopular and there is a broad consensus for the withdrawal of American forces.  Second, as progressives have long predicted, the specter of withdrawal is creating new political bargaining space and opportunities for reconciliation.  Finally, it is quite apparent that the Bush administration will be leaving the Obama administration with a messy, complicated and unstable situation in Iraq.

The Iraqi Parliament postponed until tomorrow its vote on an accord with the U.S. that lays out a timetable for American withdrawal.  The long anticipated Status of Forces Agreement laying out a timetable for U.S. withdrawal will be voted on by the Iraqi parliament tomorrow, but a last minute concession by Iraqi lawmakers may carry tremendous complications for the U.S.  According to the AP, "Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's ruling coalition appears to be assured of at least a slim majority in the 275-seat legislature. But the prime minister seeks a bigger win that transcends Iraq's factionalism and sectarian divisions and reinforces the legitimacy of the pact, which could lead to full Iraqi sovereignty and close the bloody chapter that began with the U.S.-led invasion in 2003." In order to build broad support for the pact, Shia and Kurdish blocs agree to Sunni demands to hold a "national referendum on the deal in 2009."  "So the deal, if approved in the parliamentary vote, could still be rescinded if it fails in the popular referendum...In addition to the referendum, the Sunni Arabs and smaller groups in parliament have made their agreement to the pact conditional on a package of sweeping political reforms for a more equitable power-sharing formula between Shia, Kurdish and Sunni communities." [LA Times, 11/26/08. NY Times, 11/26/08. AP 11/26/08] 

If it comes to pass, a national referendum on the Security Agreement in 2009 would complicate withdrawal plans and throw Iraq into further political confusion.  The referendum would create a major wildcard in Iraqi politics, with a potentially heated vote happening in the run up to the next national elections in 2009.  This would create a new opportunity for spoilers such as Iran, AQI, and the Sadrists to try and derail the agreement and could dramatically raise tensions inside the country.  The referendum could potentially place U.S. troops in a complicated situation.  Were the referendum to take place, it would come after the expiration of the UN mandate, which provides legal recognition of the U.S. presence in Iraq up until December 31, 2008.  No one is certain of what would happen if the referendum failed, but it "would give the U.S. at least a year and a half to leave Iraq...  That's because the vote likely wouldn't take place until July, and the security agreement requires each side to give the other notice of at least one year before ending the pact."  [AP 11/26/08.  McClatchy, 11/26/08]

On the other hand, the new reconciliation package would be a positive step that demonstrates that an American withdrawal could force Iraq's various political factions to make the tough political steps necessary for political reconciliation.  The greatest hindrance increating lasting stability in Iraq is the lack of political reconciliation, which could still cause the whole country to destabilize or unravel.  The Maliki government is in need of not just a narrow passage of the agreement, but broad national consensus to provide the necessary political cover and ensure that the agreement does not become a major political liability for Maliki and his allies.  As a result the Sunnis have a great deal of leverage and have been able to push for political reconciliation initiatives that would otherwise have been unachievable. "The Sunni Arabs and smaller groups in parliament have made their agreement to the pact conditional on a package of sweeping political reforms for a more equitable power-sharing formula between the country's Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities.  Sunni Arabs want bigger representation in the Shiite-dominated security forces and the release of thousands of detainees, mostly Sunnis, held in U.S.-run facilities, but not charged with specific crimes. Under the security deal, detainees will be handed over to Iraqi authorities if arrest warrants are issued." [USA Today, 11/26/08]