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Addressing the Proliferation Challenge
5/4/09
“More nuclear-armed states means more risks to peace and stability… We can help by making deeper nuclear arms reductions, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and fulfilling the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – steps that would have a powerful effect.” – Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, co-chairman 9-11 Commission, November 9, 2008
This week representatives from around the world will meet at the Preparatory Conference for the next Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Nuclear proliferation presents a grave threat to American and global security. Unsecured stockpiles of weapons and materials are vulnerable to terrorists who can steal or buy a weapon on the black market and use it on a civilian population. The emergence of new nuclear states can destabilize entire regions. Moreover, continued proliferation could lead to an arms race in Asia that could eventually spread across the globe.
The spread of nuclear weapons is a problem we can do something about and one where other nations actually desire U.S. leadership. On April 5 in Prague, President Obama outlined his ambitious agenda to combat nuclear proliferation by announcing US leadership in strengthening and updating the faltering nuclear non-proliferation regime. The President promised to take the following steps:
- Negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia to reduce stockpiles of warheads;
- Pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would eliminate testing and thus make it much more difficult to develop new reliable nuclear weapons;
- Work toward a new Fissile Material Treaty that would ban production of material used to create nuclear weapons thus making it more difficult for new nuclear states to emerge;
- Secure vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material worldwide and turn efforts to combat nuclear terrorism like the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into international regimes; and most importantly
- Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically in regard to recent developments in Iran and North Korea.
The pursuit of nuclear weapons capability by terrorist networks like al Qaeda threatens US and global security. This threat cannot be addressed strictly through a counterterrorism strategy but must also include reducing the number of weapons that terrorists could get their hands on. While the technical difficulty of creating a nuclear weapon presents a significant obstacle to terrorists building their own weapon, individuals and terrorist organizations have already attempted to tap into a vast global network of materials and expertise. As Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, said, “The number of incidents reported to the Agency involving the theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive material is disturbingly high... Equally troubling is the fact that much of this material is not subsequently recovered. Sometimes material is found which had not been reported missing.” In addition, the global nature of the threat and the fact that terrorists are non-state actors requires an international effort to address the nonproliferation challenges. As the report from the Commission on the Prevention of WMDs and Terrorism (WMD Commission) says, “Money is moved, transactions are made, information is shared, instructions are issued, and attacks are unleashed with a keystroke. Weapons of tremendous destructive capability can be developed or acquired by those without access to an industrial base or even an economic base of any kind, and those weapons can be used to kill thousands of people and disrupt vital financial, communications, and transportation systems, which are easy to attack and hard to defend.” [Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 11/2/08.]
The emergence of new nuclear weapons states destabilizes entire regions. Moreover, their lack of experience in securing the weapons and maintaining command and control systems, make them most likely sites of an accidental nuclear exchange or theft. As the WMD Commission writes, “As additional countries acquire nuclear facilities—particularly if they build uranium enrichment facilities or reprocessing facilities, ostensibly to provide fuel for their power plants and reduce the waste associated with the spent nuclear fuel—the number of states possessing the knowledge and capability to “breakout” and produce nuclear weapons will increase significantly. This also increases the risk that such materials could be diverted to, or stolen by, terrorist groups.” Another concern is that as the number of states that have nuclear material and expertise increases, so do the chances that nuclear material will fall into the hands of non-state actors. This nightmare scenario has already occurred. We know of at least one attempt to create a nuclear black market: “The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, was revealed in 2004 to have led an international network that traded nuclear material and expertise to North Korean, Iran, and Libya.” The Atlantic expands, saying “Libya, in subsequently renouncing its nuclear ambitions, had named Pakistan, and particularly the Khan Research Laboratories, as the supplier of what was to be a complete store-bought nuclear-weapons program... the Pakistani-run network had provided information and nuclear-weapons components to Iran and North Korea, and had begun negotiations with a fourth country, perhaps Syria or Saudi Arabia.” And as we see today in Pakistan, countries with nuclear stockpiles can fall into political instability, leaving the nuclear arsenal at a greater risk of theft. Pakistan and North Korea also give rise to concerns about new nuclear states’ desires to traffic in weapons technology for money or prestige. [Matt Bunn, 12/08. The Atlantic, 11/05. Center for American Progress, 11/08. NY Times, 12/12/02.]
Continued testing and development of weapons in nuclear states, most notably India, could trigger an arms race – most notably in South Asia – which would dramatically increase the size of stockpiles and the chance of a nuclear exchange. As states continue to test their nuclear weapons, rivals and potential rivals feel threatened and react by building more weapons, leading to an arms race. We are seeing this pattern today in Asia. As the WMD Commission report states, “In October 2008, on the heels of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, China agreed to build two nuclear power plants in Pakistan. This deal—especially if it does not contain mechanisms to prevent nuclear material from being transferred from the new civilian plants to military facilities—signals a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.” India’s perceived build-up may lead to similar activities in Pakistan, a country with a high level of extremists and instability, and China, a country with a history of exporting nuclear technology to non nuclear states. China’s build up could then spark a reaction from Russia or the United States, limiting the possibility of new non-proliferation agreements and resulting in higher levels of nuclear weapons around the world. [Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 11/2/08.]
KEY STEPS TO REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT
In Prague, the President outlined an ambitious agenda to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and committed to rebuild and strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. He also recognized the necessity of US leadership in ensuring the world’s most dangerous weapons do not get into the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.
Start with START treaty renewal to continue reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty known as START-One expires in December 2009. The two countries account for 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Other nations look to these negotiations to make their own decisions. As Sen. John McCain put it, “As our two countries possess the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, we have special responsibility to reduce their number. I believe we should be prepared to enter into a new arms control agreement with Russia.” A failure to renew the treaty would ensure that stockpiles will remain dangerously high, increasing the risk of a weapon falling into the hands of the wrong people. The Obama administration has taken the first step by signing a memorandum of understanding with Russia covering a broad range of non proliferation issues, including “negotiations to draft a new treaty that could slash American and Russian arsenals by a third,” but a new treaty is by no means certain. Robert Levgold, a Russia expert at Columbia University described the stakes: “If START-One collapses, is either not extended or replaced and ends in December 2009, then basically the strategic nuclear arms regime has collapsed entirely.” [Voice of America, 11/25/08. John McCain, University of Denver 5/28/08. Joint Statement by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, 4/01/09]
Preventing the development of new nuclear weapons requires the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. currently fulfills the provisions of the CTBT and is developing technology to ensure we do not need to test in the future. But without ratifying the treaty, we cannot press China and India to do the same, or gain other political benefits. According to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, bringing the CTBT into effect carries many advantages for U.S. national security, including “guard[ing] against the renewal of the nuclear arms race,” “curb[ing] nuclear weapons proliferation,” and “strengthen[ing] the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” President Obama made a strong, early commitment to ratification: “To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my Administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.” George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn recommend the U.S. begin “Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.” [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Washington Post, 4/08/09. President Obama, 4/05/09. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Former Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn, 1/15/08]
To stem the production of dangerous weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, the U.S. should support the creation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Such a treaty would ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium – the raw material needed to build a nuclear weapon. Since the parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have informally halted development of fissile material, “the most critical participants in a cutoff would be the states outside the NPT—India, Pakistan, Israel, and now North Korea,” according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. As former head of the International Atomic Energy Association Hans Blix recently commented, “[n]egotiations about a verified Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty should have started.” This makes it all the more important for President Obama to follow through on his pledge as President-elect, to “lead a global effort to negotiate a verifiable treaty ending the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.” [NTI, Briefing on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Foreign Policy, 4/09. President-Elect Obama, December 2008]
Vulnerable fissile and weapons materials must be secured from the world’s black markets. The bipartisan WMD Commission assessed that the U.S. faces a serious threat from terrorists attempting to “carry out an attack with biological, nuclear or other unconventional weapons somewhere in the world,” and the U.S. must act urgently to counter this threat. In response to this possibility, former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, along with former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn suggested that the U.S. “[d]ramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb,” in recognition that “[t]here are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.” While in the Senate, Obama called for a “global effort to secure all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four years.” [Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 12/03/08. NY Times, 11/30/08. Senator Obama, 8/01/07. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Former Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn, 1/15/08]
The NPT must be strengthened to address the threat from nuclear proliferation: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty protects US and global security by moving nuclear states toward disarmament, prohibiting non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons, and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power. As the bipartisan Partnership for a Secure America says, “without the NPT, there is no doubt that more countries would possess nuclear weapons.” The past eight years have seen dangerous erosion in this regime. The Bush administration’s disastrous policy toward Iraq, Iran and North Korea brought a new player into the nuclear club and placed another at its door step. The Obama administration has announced a serious effort to strengthen the NPT by making significant moves toward disarmament (mentioned above), working with our partners and allies to strengthen inspections and creating “real and immediate” consequences for countries caught breaking the rules, and promoting a framework for civil nuclear cooperation in the form of an international fuel bank. [PSA, 5/04/09]
What We’re Reading
As Pakistan deteriorates, the U.S. has few policy options. The U.S. is particularly concerned about nuclear security.
The Pakistani military accused the Taliban of using 2,000 civilians as human shields in Buner province. The Taliban attacked a Pakistani military convoy in Swat valley. The New York Times examines the role of Islamic schools in Pakistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai registered for the Afghan presidential election. He announced a new running mate, a powerful Tajik warlord, and removed his current VP, the brother of a slain resistance hero. A prominent opposition challenger withdrew his name from the presidential race after a four-hour meeting with Karzai. President Karzai will join Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in Washington later this week.
The European Commission predicts that EU economies will contract by 4% this year.
The Maoist Prime Minister of Nepal resigned after the president refused to let him fire the army chief.
Israel faces a hard sell on its new foreign policy, headed by controversial foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman.
Questioned by a fourth grader at a Washington school, Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice again defended President Bush on enhanced interrogation techniques, saying that he wouldn’t have authorized anything illegal.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits the Middle East, intending to reassure allies on the U.S. outreach to Iran.
President Obama plans to reform tax policy to crack down on multinational corporations and those who use tax havens.
Amir Taheri looks at how Iran fills power vacuums and spreads its influence throughout the Middle East, claiming that the Obama administration’s “weakness” and exit strategy will allow Iran to rise regardless of diplomatic successes.
A.J. Langguth says that the U.S. in fact has a 45-year history of torture, describing U.S. involvement in atrocities in South America.
