In its latest effort to show progress in Iraq, the Bush Administration has touted the success of its alliances with Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda. This argument is likely to be central to the Administration’s progress report in September. Unfortunately, the tactic is fraught with danger and is not likely to bring long-term stability to Iraq.

The U.S. has used this tactic in the past, arming the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s. Those “allies” later formed the leadership of Al Qaeda. Moreover, the U.S. is now training security forces, who are primarily Shi’a and at the same time arming Sunni tribal groups that hate Al Qaeda but also hate the Shi’a. In essence this approach amounts to arming both sides in a civil war. Empowering these tribal groups, most of whom oppose the Maliki government, also undermines the President’s “surge” strategy. The plan calls for fostering political reconciliation among the various groups – not arming them to fight each other. In fact, the “Anbar Strategy” directly contradicts General Petraeus’s United States Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which states that “Counterinsurgents should avoid taking sides, when possible. Perceived favoritism can exacerbate civil strife and make counterinsurgents more desirable targets for sectarian violence.”

 

American officers acknowledge that providing weapons to rebel groups is not new in counterinsurgency warfare and has backfired in the past with these elements turning against the United States. In Afghanistan the U.S. government armed the Mujahedeen and Osama Bin Laden to fight the Soviets. They later formed Al Qaeda. This tactic has been tried before in the French colonial war in Algeria, the British-led fight against insurgents in Malaya in the early 1950s, and in Vietnam and the effort often backfired, with weapons given to the rebels being turned against the forces providing them. [NY Times, 6/11/07 ]

Financing and training Sunni tribes contradicts General Petraeus’s own counterinsurgency manual. The United States Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written by General Petraeus, states that “Counterinsurgents should avoid taking sides, when possible. Perceived favoritism can exacerbate civil strife and make counterinsurgents more desirable targets for sectarian violence.” [Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 12/15/06 ]

By arming Sunni tribal groups and at the same time arming security forces that are primarily Shi’a, the U.S is arming both sides in a civil war. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch said commanders would face hard decisions in choosing which groups to support. ''This isn't a black and white place,'' he said. ''There are good guys and bad guys and there are groups in between,'' and separating them was a major challenge. According to Lynch, ''[the Sunnis] say, 'We hate you because you are occupiers…but we hate Al Qaeda worse, and we hate [Iraq’s Shi’as] even more.' '' [NY Times, 6/11/07 ]

The U.S. still has no effective system in place for keeping track of the weapons that it gives to Sunni tribal groups and Iraqi security forces. The GAO reports that the Pentagon "cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded military equipment and weapons". Since 2003, Congress has provided $19.2 billion to develop Iraq's security forces, all of which was to be run outside the DOD's usual channels for training and equipping foreign armies. The GAO audit , released on July 31, 2007, said the US could not account for 190,000 weapons that had been transferred to Iraqi Security Forces in 2004 and 2005. During this period, training of the ISF was led by Gen. David Petraeus. According to the report, “DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for about 110,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 pistols, 135,000 items of body armor, and 115,000 helmets reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005.” The report also states that clear guidelines for accountability have not been established as of July 2007. The GAO even discovered confusion among US military officials over whether or not the serial numbers of weapons transferred to Iraqi forces were supposed to be recorded or not. [Washington Post, 8/6/07 ]

The Anbar approach often involves releasing prisoners who have attacked American troops. Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, stated that, "We are ready and willing to engage with key leaders of any groups opposing AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq] or other extremist groups." Odierno said that first the leaders of the groups agree to stop attacking U.S. and Iraqi forces. Then they pledge to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq. Finally, U.S. and Iraqi officials try to get them to become part of Iraqi security forces, usually the police. A U.S. military intelligence official involved in Iraq matters explained that the United States “will release people to tribal or other key leaders -- including former insurgent leaders who are now working to fight AQI -- as long as they are legitimate leaders in their areas.” [Washington Post, 7/20/07 ]

Arming Sunnis who oppose the Iraqi national government undermines national reconciliation efforts and further weakens the national government. The U.S. policy of enlisting Sunni militants as allies in the fight against al Qaeda has drawn sharp criticism from the Shi’a prime minister who has threatened to start arming Shi’a militias in response. Sami al-Askari, a key aide to al-Maliki and a member of the prime minister's Dawa Party, said the policy of incorporating one-time Sunni insurgents into the security forces shows Gen. David Petraeus has a "real bias and it bothers the Shi’a." A lawmaker from the al-Sadr bloc, speaking the condition of anonymity, said al-Maliki has complained to President Bush about the policy of arming Sunnis. "He told Bush that if Petraeus continues doing that, he would arm Shiite militias. Bush told al-Maliki to calm down," according to this parliament member, who said he was told of the exchange by al-Maliki. [Washington Post, 7/28/07 ]

The tribal approach does little to address the issue of sectarian strife and civil war, which is the single greatest source of violence and instability in Iraq. Sectarian violence has returned to pre-surge levels in Baghdad. Up to 592 bodies were found in different parts of Baghdad between June 18 and July 18 2007. The bodies, averaging around 20 a day, are victims of sectarian violence carried out by both Sunni and Shi’a death squads. Moreover, according to Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, Shi'a militiamen have launched three-quarters of the attacks that killed or wounded American forces last month in Baghdad. [Iraq Slogger, 7/24/07 . AP, 8/5/07 ]