The long-term success of counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan means denying the country to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups as a safe haven – which means helping the Afghan government become sufficiently stable, representative and effective that its citizens prefer it to the promises and threats of extremists.

As the fifth lowest ranking state on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index, Afghanistan faces extraordinary challenges. Yet, considering the importance of the outcome, the U.S. contribution to reconstruction has been shockingly small. In constant dollars per capita, we have spent far less in Afghanistan than in Iraq – or in the Balkans in the 1990s. We have allowed the aid efforts to be poorly coordinated and riddled with waste – and funneled large amounts of the money back to American contractors rather than to Afghan agencies.

This failure is undermining the Karzai government and demoralizing Afghan civilians, making it easier for the Taliban insurgency to reestablish itself. A stronger Taliban endangers our troops and poses a significant threat to all that we have achieved in Afghanistan. Washington must take care of our long-term security interests – and keep our promises to the Afghan people – by refocusing on Afghanistan, redoubling our assistance efforts, and addressing the problems of management and coordination on the ground.

According to the Brookings Institution, Afghanistan is the world’s second weakest state. Not only did Afghanistan receive a worse rating than Iraq, but it is also the "most insecure" state, according to the Brookings Weak State Index. "It has suffered from a long history of violent conflict as well as a lack of government control over significant portions of its territory and an inability to curtail grave human rights abuses. In the area of social welfare, Afghanistan also receives the world’s lowest score due to high child mortality, inadequate access to improved water and sanitation, and low primary school completion rates." [Brookings, 2/26/08 ]

Afghanistan received the 5th lowest rating on the 2007/2008 Human Development Index sponsored by UNDP. It was ahead of only Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone and Niger. Its Human Poverty Index ratings are equally abysmal, and the United Nations Human Development report for Afghanistan cites that in those terms, the country ranks as one of the "worst in the world." In addition, most Afghans live on less than a dollar a day and infant mortality rates are among the world's highest, while life expectancy is extremely low. [Human Development Report for Afghanistan, 2007/2008 ]

Reconstruction is a Low Priority for the Bush Administration

Though we face greater challenges in Afghanistan than we did in any of the US engagements of the 1990s, reconstruction funding is shamefully absent. “Afghanistan has received far less aid per capita since the U.S. invasion than any other post-conflict operation, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, or even Haiti. According to one Afghan expert, ‘Aid per capita to Afghans in the first two years after the fall of the Taliban was around a tenth of that given to Bosnians following the end of the Balkan civil war in the mid-1990s.’” [Center for American Progress, 11/07 ]

Obstacles to rebuilding Afghanistan are huge, but Iraq is acting as a distraction and siphoning off resources. While Iraq has received a total of $34.2 billion in reconstruction funding over five years, Afghanistan by comparison has received just $11.5 billion over the more than seven years that U.S. forces have been on the ground and just $1.1 billion for 2008. [CRS, 02/08 .]

The Administration has not been supportive enough of an internationally monitored trust fund, designed to aid the Afghans build their capacity for good governance. “The fund is administered by the World Bank and supervised by a Management Committee consisting of the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program; it provides support for the Afghan government (including salaries, operations, and essential goods; and it funds national investment programs and projects). The United States has acknowledged the role of the Trust Fund, but has not given a significant portion of its money to it.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07 . World Bank ]

Although the Administration calls Provincial Reconstruction Teams a critical tool for Afghan reconstruction, they receive less than five percent of the US assistance budget. PRTs are joint reconstruction teams that include military, development, and diplomatic personnel. “PRTs concentrate in three areas: governance, reconstruction and security.” They engage in consultation with “provincial governors, police chiefs and elected provincial councils to increase capacity and improve the provision of services,” support Provincial Development Councils, and engage in quick action village improvement projects following the withdrawal of Taliban insurgents. Despite these sweeping responsibilities, “less than five percent of the U.S. assistance budget is channeled through U.S. PRTs.” [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08]

Money is not Reaching People in Need

The relief effort has been poorly managed and inefficient. According to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, nearly half of the aid in Afghanistan is spent on consultants and contractors, and the Afghan government cannot account for an additional $5.3 billion. [Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, 3/24/08 ]

The Former World Bank Director in Kabul described the amount of international aid wasted as intolerably high. “Jean Mazurelle, the former World Bank director in Kabul, has estimated that international aid wastage rates are between 35 and 40 percent, and has observed numerous instances of fraud and looting, often by private companies.” Additional estimates are just as troubling — “Between problems with contractors, and the endemic corruption and graft in Afghanistan’s government, U.S. and UK officials have estimated that up to half of international aid is siphoned off by corrupt police and tribal officials.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07 ]

Much like the mission to secure the country, reconstruction programs in Afghanistan are poorly coordinated. Though there are 60 international donors to Afghanistan, their “programs to provide rural Afghans with alternative income sources remain underfunded and poorly coordinated. Each of NATO's regional Afghan commands operates its own provincial reconstruction teams, and scores of nongovernmental organizations work in the country. But with few exceptions — such as Khost province under U.S. command in the east, where military and reconstruction resources are meshed — they share no overriding strategy or operational rules.” [Washington Post, 1/14/08 ]

Reconstruction failures have badly tarnished the Karzai government and created opportunities for the Taliban. “They [Afghans] are also increasingly frustrated with the failure of President Karzai’s government to extend its authority and services throughout the country and by the lack of improvement in their daily lives six years after the international reconstruction process was launched. The Taliban have been able to exploit the Karzai government’s shortcomings to their advantage.” [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08 ]

With few tangible benefits from reconstruction efforts, public support for the government is decreasing. In 2005, 77 percent of Afghans felt that their country was headed in the right direction, but today that number has dwindled to 54 percent. The Jones-Pickering report suggests that a failure to address longstanding challenges stemming from “insecurity, weak governance, widespread corruption, a poor economy and unemployment” is at the core of declining Afghan support. [ABC News, 12/03/07 , Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08 ]

Failing to involve the Afghan government in the rebuilding of the country will result in diminished future capabilities. “According to Afghanistan’s Finance Ministry, only 12 percent of the money from the international donor community for reconstruction and development projects was actually channeled through the Afghan government.” This portends trouble, as “the current distribution of resources undermines comprehensive, long-term, effective planning and the ability of the Afghan government to provide services or establish its legitimacy.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07 ]

Success Will Require That The United States Redouble Its Reconstruction Efforts.

There can be no reconstruction without security and the United States must do more in this regard. "There is a need for more U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is larger in size and population than Iraq but has far fewer national and foreign troops.” [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08 ]

The United States should increase overall reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. “The vast majority of U.S. funding in Afghanistan has gone to security. An additional $1 billion should be provided in non-military aid, contingent on greater transparency and accountability in U.S. assistance.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07 ]

Enhance coordination of reconstruction initiatives. “Coordination between the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is essential. Because most PRTs report directly back to national capitals, coordination among all the PRTs, with NGOs and with the Karzai government is at best ad hoc. In fact, most PRTs are stove-piped back to national capitals and the ISAF commander has no ability to influence or coordinate their work. That must be corrected so that what happens in one province is related to both neighboring provinces as well as the national effort.” [Atlantic Council, 1/31/08 ]

The Afghans must play a more active role in reconstruction to be perceived as legitimate. “The donor community should focus on giving the Afghan government credit for projects and programs. To do so, donors need to focus on improving Afghan government accounting and enhance anti-corruption reforms.” In addition, development assistance must reach provinces soon after they rid themselves of the Taliban’s presence, lest their inhabitants turn away from the fragile Afghan government. [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08 ]

The PRT program must be strengthened across the board. “PRTs should reflect the strategic overview of U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan and play an assigned role, tailored to the local circumstances. PRTs need an agreed concept of operations and basic common organizational structure as well as goals and objectives so they provide a standard range of services. They also need to coordinate among themselves on a regular basis (and not settle for quarterly conferences) to exchange ideas on “best practices.” There is need for a common source of quick disbursing funds for PRTs, so they can support short and long-term development projects. PRTs need to provide information about their accomplishments to Afghans and the international community. There is also need for a set of metrics to evaluate PRT operations.” [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08 ]