Overview

The threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates presents a tremendous challenge to the security of the American people. Al Qaeda is a complex organization which comprises: a centralized leadership in Northwest Pakistan; affiliated franchise organizations around the world, such as Al Qaeda in Iraq; and self-starter cells that are inspired by Al Qaeda propaganda but have no direct relationship. Rather then deal with this complex reality, conservatives have lumped all these groups under the umbrella of “Islamofascism.” This oversimplification damages our ability to pursue an effective counterterrorism strategy. We need to understand our enemies if we are to deal with them effectively.

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that the greatest threat to the American homeland emanates from Al Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan – the very same entity that attacked us on 9/11. The nation’s 16 intelligence agencies concluded that Al Qaeda’s leaders have reconstituted a new safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northwest Pakistan, on the border with Afghanistan, from which future attacks are most likely to be planned and coordinated. However, a more recent assessment has found that Al Qaeda’s capabilities have been significantly degraded by predator strikes in the FATA.

In addition to this central leadership, Al Qaeda franchises and affiliated groups are based throughout the world, and while they do not present the same direct threat to the homeland as Al Qaeda’s central leadership, they are still capable of conducting major terrorist attacks in their own regions. The most successful of these franchises has been Al Qaeda in Iraq, but there are also many active organizations in North Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. Finally, there are Al Qaeda-inspired self starter groups, primarily in Europe, that have no direct affiliation to the central organization but have been inspired by a vast network of jihadi websites and propaganda. These groups are the least capable of pulling off major attacks, but can also be the most difficult to track down.

The war in Iraq has had a major impact on international terrorism, empowering Al Qaeda and undermining American interests. Repeated investigations have not established any operational relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda before the 2003 invasion. But since then there is no question that Al Qaeda succeeded in establishing a franchise, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which assaulted U.S. troops and stirred up ethnic tensions. More broadly, U.S. setbacks in Iraq have served Al Qaeda as a tool for recruitment, propaganda, fundraising, training and indoctrination, and, as a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate describes it, “a cause celebre” for terrorists. Since the rise of the Awakening movements starting in late 2006 and the subsequent troop surge, AQI has suffered major setbacks and its influence in Iraq has declined dramatically. Overall, history has shown that the most potentially devastating attacks against American and allied targets are still planned by Al Qaeda’s central leadership – not franchises.

Self-starter terrorist cells have been uncovered among Muslim diaspora populations in Europe and elsewhere. They consist of disaffected local Muslim extremists who organize with the help of websites, which provide ideological propaganda as well as instructions on how to make weapons and execute attacks. These cells – and the discontent of their members – represent a serious concern. They underscore the need to focus on the “war of ideas” against Al Qaeda as well as the battle on the physical battlefield. But like Al Qaeda in Iraq, these cells are not as capable as Al Qaeda central, and do not present the same level of threat.

The reality of Islamic extremism is complex. The various groups and countries involved have different goals and capabilities, often work at cross-purposes, and are sometimes as focused on fighting each other (in Iraq, for example) as on fighting the West. Yet the conservative response to this complexity has been to lump various groups and countries together including Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Iraq, other Al Qaeda franchises, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran into one threat that they term “Islamofascism.”

Successful counterterrorism requires a much more nuanced approach that distinguishes between these various groups’ intentions and capabilities. This strategy requires the careful and deliberate application of all aspects of American power: military, law enforcement, public diplomacy, finance, intelligence, homeland security, and non-proliferation.

Policy Recommendations

We must develop a comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategy that eliminates long-term support for Al Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Bush administration took its eye off the ball in the fight against Al Qaeda and other violent extremists, and allowed them to reconstitute. The U.S. needs a new and comprehensive approach toward fighting those who attacked us on 9/11. The U.S. should design a comprehensive strategy that recognizes the limits of military power and works to build Afghan state capacity to more effectively combat the Taliban. The U.S. must also integrate Pakistan policy within strategy for Afghanistan.and engage in vigorous diplomacy with all neighboring countries and our allies. .

It's time to reduce the drag of Iraq on our global effort against international terrorists. We must begin responsibly draw down our forces from Iraq so that we can more effectively combat terrorism. The Iraq quagmire diverts resources from dealing with international terrorists. It provides a recruiting and fundraising poster for the Al Qaeda movement worldwide. It allows terrorists to observe and test tactics and acquire skills for use elsewhere. As long as we are in Iraq, we cannot be effective in the rest of the Muslim world.  President Obama’s plan to withdraw most of our troops from Iraq by August 2010 and all of troops by the end of 2011 sets us on the right path.

We must secure nuclear materials around the globe so they never fall into the hands of terrorists. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is the single greatest threat to our national security. Preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction in the first place is far easier than trying to prevent their deployment after the fact. The U.S. must launch an accelerated strategy to secure all nuclear material across the globe, particularly in the former Soviet Union, where hundreds of tons of nuclear materials remain vulnerable.

The U.S. must work to build strong and effective alliances. Combating global terrorism is a task beyond the capability of any one nation. Committed allies and friends are essential. Since 9/11, cooperation with allied and friendly intelligence services to identify, track and prosecute key members of jihadi groups has been painfully inadequate – due in large measure to the incompetence of the Bush administration. Even though many countries are unable to address the terrorist threat effectively within their own borders, the Bush administration was unwilling to work with donors to set up an international mechanism to coordinate assistance to, and increase the capacity of, these less capable nations.  The Obama administration should change course and take the lead in coordinating global counterterrorism efforts.  

We must transform our military and intelligence capabilities to more effectively detect and respond to the Al Qaeda threat. The terrorist threat requires a new focus on human intelligence and an increase in recruitment and training of speakers of Arabic, Urdu, Pashtu and other Middle Eastern and central Asian languages. The Army must also increase the size of the Special Forces and add more counterterrorism capabilities.

The U.S. must adopt an opportunity and empowerment agenda to reduce corruption, increase education, strengthen public institutions, expand trade, and support democratic reform in the Muslim world. In the long run, open and free societies will help promote greater stability. However, reform is not just about elections, and cannot be achieved through regime change by military force. It is a long and arduous process that cannot be a unilaterally American operation. It requires broad international, political and fiscal support. It must be responsive to local needs and include initiatives to reduce corruption, increase education, strengthen public institutions, and expand trade. The democratic reform effort must also build the rule of law and foster the development of individual entrepreneurs. In the end, rather then imposing instant change, America’s goal should be to help create an environment more conducive to reform.

Along with the international community, we must work to limit war and civil or sectarian strife in regions around the world where terrorists can find sanctuary or seek adherents. Regions in conflict offer sanctuary and recruits for terrorism, and fuel the broader terrorist movement. Iraq, Somalia, Kashmir, Sudan, Nigeria and Lebanon are some notable examples. Such conflicts are often exploited by religious extremists to transform them into conflicts of civilization, drawing in militants from outside and creating ever more violent clashes. The Bush administration rarely played a role in efforts to settle these conflicts with pre-emptive diplomacy; the Obama administration must do more with our allies and international organizations to help resolve them.

The Conservative Record

The Bush administration was distracted from Afghanistan by Iraq, and committed too few resources to address the threat of a resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda. Prior to the start of the war in Iraq, Special Forces units, intelligence assets, and military equipment were transferred to Iraq. Because the Bush administration shifted focus from Afghanistan to Iraq, the U.S. was never able to achieve its original strategic goals in Afghanistan.  The Taliban and Al Qaeda have steadily rebuilt, becoming stronger every year.

The Bush administration created a terrorist training ground where one did not exist. Contrary to assertions made by the administration before the war, Iraq never had an operational relationship with Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. As a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration’s inability to patrol the country's porous border, Iraq has become a magnet for foreign Al Qaeda fighters, a test site for terrorist tactics and weapons, and a propaganda bonanza for anti-American elements. The nation’s 16 intelligence agencies agree that the war has created a “cause celebre” for terrorists around the world.

The simplistic term “Islamofascism,” which conservatives consistently use to define the challenges the U.S. faces, undermines America’s national security and obscures the threat. Since 9/11, conservatives have lumped various groups and countries together, including Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran into one threat that they term “Islamofascism.” The reality is more complicated. These various groups have different intentions and capabilities, often work at cross purposes, and are in some cases ideologically opposed to each other. By muddling these various threats, conservatives make it impossible to pursue effective policies and have caused the U.S. to miss numerous opportunities to play these groups off of each other to America’s benefit. Moreover, the term “Islamofascism” creates the perception that the U.S. is fighting a religious war against Islam, thus alienating moderate voices willing to work with America towards common goals.

The Bush administration poisoned relations with key allies by attacking Iraq without building a broad coalition, failed to utilize international institutions, and ignored America’s international obligations regarding torture, human rights, and respect for the rule of law. Based on polling around the world, the U.S. is today more poorly regarded than at any time since such polling began. Major candidates in allied countries run their campaigns using anti-American rhetoric. American support for democracy and human rights has been called into question by the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. When we need others to act with us against common threats, our image matters.